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BOOK REVIEW 
 
Chad Carlson 
Eastern Illinois University 
 
Gadamer’s ethics of play: Hermeneutics and the other, by Monica Vilhauer, Lanham, MD, 
Lexington Books, 2010, 166 pp., £37 (hardback), ISBN 978-0739139141 
 
 
As a naıve graduate student, I remember signing up for a course in the Philosophy Department 
entitled, ‘Art and Truth’. Although I was studying sport and play in a different department, I 
was intrigued by the title – art seemed closely related to play and sport in the landscape of 
human experiences. Further, the course was offered at a convenient time and it fulfilled a 
deficiency I had toward graduation. Unfortunately, I had no idea what I was getting into. The 
course readings, which included Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty, Jacques Derrida, Jurgen Habermas, and, most prominently, Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
seemed so dense that they necessitated long hours of introduction and prior training that I did 
not have. I was not familiar with their ‘philosophy-speak’ and did not know, for instance, what 
Heidegger meant by ‘being-in-the-world’ or what Merleau-Ponty meant by ‘always already.’ 
 
My laborious efforts to quickly gather any kind of understanding of the deep, broad, intricate, and 
slow-moving arguments of these Continental Philosophers left me in no way intrinsically interested in 
what they had to say. In other words, reading Continental Philosophy felt to me like hard work. 
 
So imagine my surprise at the end of the term when I found that Gadamer wrote extensively on the 
concept of play. What an un-playful way to discuss this particular phenomenon. While play is often 
described as enjoyable, attractive, serendipitous, and alluring, the writings of Gadamer and other 
Continental Philosophers – even those on play – seemed to invoke opposing affectation to me. 
 
Now imagine my surprise when I read Monica Vilhauer’s book titled, Gadamer’s Ethics of 
Play: Hermeneutics and the Other, and actually understood the arguments! My hard work 
during ‘Art and Truth’ class must have paid off. . . or else Vilhauer’s analysis of Gadamer is so 
clear that even I could understand it. 
 
Vilhauer’s analysis of Gadamerian ideas in Gadamer’s Ethics of Play constitutes a large 
amount of the manuscript, and rightfully so. The author argues that since play is such a central 
concept in Gadamer’s philosophy, a great deal of background on Gadamer’s work – especially 
that in his magnum opus, Truth and Method – is needed in order to better understand how he 
views play. And I would argue that a great deal of background on Gadamerian philosophy is 
needed to understand his work at all. 
 
Accordingly, Vilhauer begins her book by analyzing Gadamer’s underlying hermeneutical 
problem: to better understand understanding. Unfortunately, in Gadamer’s view, scientific knowledge 
has become the dominant mode of knowing or coming to truth. Yet he believes that a much 
better way of understanding comes not from abstract reflection or measurement of things (like 
scientists do), but from genuine, open dialogue between people or things who are and identify 
themselves as always a part of an ever-changing world. 
 
Part II of the book details Gadamer’s argument that real, genuine dialogue is play. Vilhauer 
produces this section in a very Gadamerian way. First, she describes other models that do not 
seem to produce truth, or real understanding. Then she uses art as an example of how understanding 
truth in something actually happens as play. In fact, most secondary literature on Gadamer’s 
philosophy of understanding uses art as a reference. And so, to go beyond the relatively popular 
Gadamerian interpretations through the mode of art, Vilhauer reminds the reader that the way in 
which a spectator finds truth in a painting over time is the same way in which interlocution reveals 
truth over time – in both cases, there is a phenomenological dialogue between two parties that are 
open to the revelation of truth which comes over time. (Full disclosure: it was in this section that I 
had my most intense de´ja` vu moments of graduate school. I simultaneously experienced frustration 
from my memories of ‘Art and Truth’ class and also relief that Vilhauer’s prose came to me in 
a much clearer way than anything I read or heard in that class.) 
 
In Part III, Vilhauer explains that experiencing truth through open, real, genuine dialogic play 
is not only hermeneutically superior to all other understanding, but also that there is ethical normativity 
at stake. While genuine, dialogic play is the best way to come to truth within the world, it 
is also a part of a basic human ethical obligation. As Vilhauer explains, being open to the Other or 
to other ideas or viewpoints ‘is a commitment to another human being’ (p. 84). 
 
It is in this section of the book that Vilhauer most tellingly reveals her deep devotion to 
Gadamerian philosophy. This discipleship produces the author’s vast understanding and highly effective 
interpretation of Gadamer’s hermeneutics and philosophy. This is relayed to the audience 
throughout each of the first three sections of the script. However, Vilhauer confronts counterarguments 
inPart III, particularly those from Derrida, Habermas, and Robert Bernasconi. While she appropriately 
presents and acknowledges them, her rejoinders leave something to be desired. In Chapter 5, 
for instance, she often gives compelling descriptions of Gadamer’s theories (which shows good 
argumentation), then makes compelling criticisms via Derrida, Habermas, and Bernasconi (also good 
argumentative technique). However, it seems as though her rejoinders often simply re-state the original 
Gadamerian argument. Generally, responding to counterarguments puts the criticism to rest and 
further amplifies the persuasiveness of the original argument. At times, the author has no trouble 
overcoming the arguments of Gadamer’s critics. At other times, though, the lack of strength in the 
rejoinders allows the reader to potentially accept the counterargument. This might allow the reader to 
wonder why the author so devotedly accepts Gadamer’s arguments. Or it might be her subtle application 
of the Gadamerian call to be open in order for real, genuine dialogue to occur. 
 
In Part IV, Vilhauer offers some transparency about her Gadamerian slants that is absent in her 
early analysis. This section provides the only commentary on applying Gadamer’s theory on play 
and understanding. To do so, that is to break from the dense Gadamerian world of ideas and express 
some practical application of these ideas, Vilhauer asks ancient philosophers to guide the way. In 
this change of pace, in which the author invokes Socrates’ dialogue-based theories and Aristotle’s 
ethics, we come to see the real world value of Gadamer’s theories of understanding through play. 
 
Further, in this section we also see the author’s willingness to express arguments that are not 
necessarily directly in line with Gadamer. For instance, while Gadamer’s philosophy seems 
rigidly dualistic in that he values or prioritizes verbal language as the basis for understanding 
without acknowledging similar merits in any other form of communication, Vilhauer believes 
that this is too narrow. Much to my pleasure, she argues that games and sports rather than 
verbal discourse or works of art may be among the best ways that we can open ourselves up 
to others and facilitate the type of Gadamerian dialogue that leads to real, genuine truth. 
 
Clearly, based on the above analysis of understanding, hermeneutics, interpretation, and truth, 
Gadamer’s Ethics of Play offers relatively complex and nuanced argumentation. In other words, 
this book is not for the philosophically timid. A familiarity with Continental Philosophy and 
modern European philosophers is not necessary, but will certainly provide a background that 
will make this manuscript much more enjoyable. It is clear, after all, that Vilhauer has a robust 
and positive understanding of Gadamer’s philosophy. 
 
The author’s training on hermeneutics, ethics, and Gadamer have played out in a book that is 
largely and obviously about these topics. Unfortunately for play scholars, revealing insight about 
the concept of play is much less prominent. While ‘play’ is in the title, the content of the book is largely 
about hermeneutics – theories of understanding or interpretation – and ethics that derive 
from Gadamer’s hermeneutical models. Answering questions such as, ‘What is play?’ ‘Why do 
we play?’ and ‘How do we play?’ are not a part of Gadamer’s or Vilhauer’s agendas. Instead, they 
persuade us that when we come to real, open, and genuine dialogue with some Other that leads to 
truth about the world, we come to do so through a process of play that facilitates the emergence of 
truth. When we seem to have problems understanding other people or things in the world, we may 
need to re-engage with the Other through play. 
 
Like understanding the theory itself, this task of coming to truth through real, genuine dialogue 
is not easy. In fact, it often takes a long time and a great deal of difficulty. And I, for one, 
would know, because Vilhauer has finally helped me to understand some of the truths that I 
had shut myself off from back in graduate school.	  
